ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS UNDER COLLEC.
TIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS

Missues
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ANY of the recent judicial opinions on labor matters involve

concerning union recognition and the right to bargain

\
collectively.' But a still larger and less explored field lies ahead,
involving the administration of collective bargaining contracts after they
are made. In industries in which collective bargaining is firmly established, the principal problem of both the management and the union is to
eliminate disputes arising out of the interpretation and application of the
contracts arrived at by collective bargaining. These disputes are called
grievances. The name describes their nature and yet belies their importance.
Any personnel executive will tell you that the most important factor in
maintaining a satisfactory morale among employees is to prevent the individual employee from feeling that an injustice has been done him. Such
a feeling is a festering sore which increases in pain and spreads with the
lack of attention. Now that employees have collective bargaining contracts, they are conscious, and jealous as well, of their rights thereunder.
From the management's viewpoint the problem of grievances is or should
be No. i on its industrial relations program.
Labor leaders will tell you that they must constantly watch minor
supervisory employees and often the major executives in order to prevent
violations of the contract. These violations would in time destroy the
efficacy of the contract. The rights so dearly won may be easily dissipated. The closest contact that a union has with the individual member
is through the handling of his grievance. This is a day-to-day matter and
often is reflected in the amount of the individual's pay check. Prompt
prosecution of a grievance by the union makes the aggrieved employee a
loyal member and brings in new adherents.
The first thing, of course, is a plan for progressive steps of conference
* Member of the Illinois Bar.

N.LR.B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 59 S. Ct. 490 (1939) (sit down strike in effort
to compel recognition of union); Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197 (1938)
(competition between rival labor unions for recognition as bargaining agent); N.L.R.B. v.
Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., Inc., 59 S. Ct. 501 (x939) (question as to what constituted refusal to bargain with union); N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304
U.S. 333 (z938) (strike in connection with negotiation of collective bargaining contract).
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between the representatives of management and the union. But if negotiation fails to settle the matter satisfactorily, what then? It is with the
"what then?" that we are concerned in this article.
- I. THE NATURE OF THE RIGHTS INVOLVED

In considering the settlement of disputes under collective bargaining
contracts, it is necessary to bear in mind the nature of the rights which
are to be adjudicated. In this article, however, it is possible only to consider the general substantive aspects.
The contracts, often referred to as craft agreements, are between the
employer and the union. The early rulings were that the individual employee could not secure relief from a breach of this agreement, but "these
rulings have been left in the rear .... and the holdings now are ....
that the rights secured by these contracts are the individual rights of the
individual members of the union and may be enforced directly by the
individual. 12 Under any of three theories 3 these rights of the individual
are contractual rights and in their essential aspects are no different from
the rights under any contract. The terms of the craft agreement are available to the non-union employee 4 as well as to the union member.
2 Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 13, 133 So. 66g, 67T (193). Cf. Langmade v. Olean Brewing Co., 137 App. Div. 355, 121 N.Y. Supp. 388 (igio) with Gulla v.
Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 149 N.Y. Supp. 952 (i914); and Hudson v. Cincinnati N.O. &
T. Ry. Co., 152 Ky. 711, 154 S.W. 47 (1913), with Gregg v. Starks, 188 Ky. 834, 224 S.W.
459 (192o); Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., ig Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042 (1923); and cf.
Snow Iron Works v. Chadwick, 227 Mass. 382, 116 N.E. 8oi (1917) with Whiting Milk Co.
v. Grondin, 282 Mass. 41, 184 N.E. 379 (1933),
3 The earliest theory in point of time is that the craft Agreement creates a custom or "rule
of the industry" and until abrogated becomes a part of the contract of employment. Yazoo &
M.V.R. Co. v. Webb, 64 F. (2d) 902 (C.C.A. 5th 1933); McCoy v. St. Joseph Belt Ry. Co.,
229 Mo. App. 5o6, 77 S.W. (2d) 175 (1934); Rentschler v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 126 Neb.
493, 498, 253 N.W. 694, 697 (1934); Whiting Milk Co. v. Grondin, 282 Mass. 41, 184 N.E.
379 (i933)- The second theory regards the union as agent of the employees. Thus, the craft
agreement becomes a direct contract between the employer and his employees. Gregg v.
Starks, i88 Ky. 834, 224 S.W. 459 (1920); Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., i9s Ky. 477,
248 S.W. 1042 (1923). The theory now most generally accepted regards the craft agreement
as a third party beneficiary contract between the union and the employer for the benefit of the
individual employees. Dierschow v. West Suburban Dairies Inc., 276 III. App. 355 (1934);
H. Blum & Co. v. Landau, 23 Ohio App. 426, x55 N.E. 154 (1926); Gulla v. Barton, 164
App. Div. 293, 149 N.Y. Supp. 952 (i914); Yazoo &M.V.R. Co. v. Sideboard, i61 Miss. 4,133
So. 669 (i913); Rentschler v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 126 Neb. 493, 253 N.W. 694 (i934);
Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., i98 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042 (1923); Gleason v. Thomas, 117
W.Va. 55o, i86 S.E. 304 (1936); Grand Internat'l Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v.
Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 31 P. (2d) 971 (1934).
4Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (x93i); Yazoo & M.V.R.
Co. v. Webb, 64 F. (2d) 902 (C.C.A. 5th 1933); Gregg v. Starks, 188 Ky. 834, 224 S.W. 459

(1920).
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On the expiration of the contract the union may negotiate a new one
with different terms, or, if the right is reserved in the contract, may by
joint agreement with the employer modify the provisions of the contract
during the term. To this extent the rights of the individual employee may
be changed. However, in the absence of actual change in the terms of the
agreement, the union may not waive the rights under the agreement of
any employee or group of employees s This is no different from the restrictions placed on the original contracting parties to any third party
beneficiary contract as regards the rights of the beneficiary under the
6
contract.
That the employment under the craft agreement is one at will, or that
such agreement may be changed at some future time, 7 is no bar to relief.
So long as the employee continues to work and the craft agreement is in
effect, he is entitled to his rights under the contract.
Complaints under collective bargaining contracts generally concern disputes regarding seniority rights, reimbursement for overtime and wage
increases for certain specified work. Wrongful discharge or discipline of
an employee, contrary to the terms of the craft agreement, is another
source of grievances. In essence the claim is one for the breach of contract.
II. THE REMEDIES AVAILABLE

Since continuity of employment is the desired objective of collective
bargaining, the problem is to find a method of settling these disputes
without interruption of work. But it is equally obvious that when negotiations fail the employee must have an effective method of redress for
violations of his rights under the craft agreement. As all lawyers know,
the practical value of a right is no greater than the available methods of
enforcement.
s Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Sideboard, i6i Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931); Yazoo & M.V.R. Co.
v. Webb, 64 F. (2d) 902 (C.C.A. 5 th 1933); Gregg v. Starks, i88 Ky. 834, 224 S.W. 459 (1920);
Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 459 (1923); Gleason v. Thomas, 117

W.Va. 55o, i86 S.E. 304 (z936); Grand Internat'l Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v.
Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 31 P. (2d) 971 ('934); McCoy v. St. Joseph Belt Ry. Co., 229 Mo. App.
5o6, 77 S.W. (2d) 175 (1934). The effect of the holding of Evans v. Johnston (Ill. App. Ct.,

First Dist., Third Div., No. 39978, pending on petition for leave to appeal to Supreme Court)
is contrary to the weight, if not the unanimity, of authority elsewhere, unless the case can be
distinguished on the ground that it relied on authority to the union from a provision of the
particular contract involved.
Hartman v. Pistorius, 248 Ill. 568, 572, 94 N.E. 131, 133 (1911).
'McCoy v. St. Joseph Belt Ry. Co., 229 Mo. App. 506, 77 S.W. (2d) 175 (1934); Grand
Internat'l Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 31 P. (2d) 971 (1934);
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (xg9s); McGlohn v. Gulf & S.I.R., 179 Miss. 396, 174 So. 250
(1937); Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 9 S.W. (2d) 692 (1928).
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a) Boards set up by agreement.-Some agreements require the parties,
on failure to reach a settlement, to submit their dispute to a neutral outsider, whose award is usually made final. Very often, however, provisions
are made for submission of the dispute to a board, generally made up of
an equal number of representatives of the employer and the union, with a
stipulation requiring submission to a neutral third party issues on which
the board is equally divided. The members of the board are for the most
part laymen and not lawyers, chosen for their familarity with the industry
and its labor problems. The decision of the board is often made final;
sometimes it is merely advisory. Frequently the decisions of the board,
especially those of the adjustment boards set up under the Railway Labor
Act,8 are printed in full and serve as guiding precedents for the board.9
Generally the bi-partisan composition of the board assures the individual employee that his rights will not be ignored. However, if the employee claims that his rights under the contract have been infringed by

the joint action of the employer and the union, his cause is determined by
a board made up entirely of his opponents. And far more precarious is the
position of a complainant who is not a member of the union!
At this point it might be relevant to inquire to what extent the existence of these boards affects the individual employee's right to resort to
the courts.,0 Generally, it would seem that the propriety of judicial relief

at any particular stage of the controversy may depend upon the source of
the board's authority and upon the extent to which the remedial provisions of the agreement are tied up with the right sought to be enforced.
Thus if the board is set up by the craft agreement itself, prior recourse
must be had to the board before instituting suit in the courts. This is on
the theory that as the agreement creating the right sought to be enforced
8 48 Stat. 1193 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 153, Second (Supp. 1938).

9Cf. the English practice under which the decisions of the Industrial Court are not binding
upon the parties unless expressly so agreed at the time the particular dispute is submitted for
adjudication, and, in order to prevent establishing precedent, no written opinion is rendered.
See Report of the Comm'n on Industrial Relations in Great Britain (United States, Dept. of
Labor, 1938).
10A distinction is to be made between a complaint which involves a violation of provisions
of the craft agreement and one which involves an alleged violation by the union of its laws.
We are here concerned with the former and not the latter. In the latter event the employee,
if he is a member of the union, must first exhaust his remedies within the union. This is in
accord with the general principle that the courts will not interfere with the internal working
of a voluntary unincorporated association until the member has exhausted his remedies within
the association. Engel v. Walsh, 258 Ill. 98, io5, ioi N.E. 222, 224 (1913); Henry v. Twichell,
286 Mass. io6, 117, 189 N.E. 593, 598 (1934). This does not apply to a non-union member as
recourse within the tribunals is not available to him. Fairbanks v. McDonald, 219 Mass. 291,
298, io6 N.E. zooo, iooi (1914).
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also provides a remedy and as all provisions of the agreement are to be
read together, the right is not only created by one provision of the agreement, but is also limited by the other provision for appeal. The provision
for appeal to the board is part of the right itself.The result is otherwise if, as is the case with most of the agreements for
the operating employees of the railroads, the method of appeal to the
board is provided in an agreement other than the one governing wages
and working conditions. As the right sought to be enforced does not arise
under the document creating the method of appeal, the latter is not a part
of the right itself. However, if the employee is a member of the union he
is held to have contracted through the union to submit his disputes to the
board and must do so before resorting to court.12 But if he is not a member
of the union, the employee is not required to submit to the board and may
3
institute independent judicial proceedings.
Often the right given under the craft agreement is a conditional one.
For instance, it is sometimes provided in the collective bargaining agreement that if an employee is discharged, he shall, on his request, be given a
hearing before certain representatives of the employer or before a board,
and that if on such hearing the employee is sustained, he shall be reinstated and paid the wages lost. Unless he shows that his claim was sus4
tained at such a hearing, the employee is not entitled to reinstatement.'
If the decisions of the board are final and binding, a serious problem is
presented to the individual employee. These agreements do not provide
for judicial review and in fact it is not seen how the parties by agreement
could create such appeal if they wished. Consequently, if the individual
employee is required to submit his dispute to the board, and if the provision for finality of the board's decision is effective, the employee would be
deprived of a judicial review of his rights under the craft agreement. But
the general rule in many, if not most, states is that as a matter of public
policy parties to a contract cannot deprive a court of its jurisdiction over
at least the legal aspects of a dispute byproviding in advance that all
disputes arising under the contract shall be submitted to arbitration on
all phases of the dispute. For example, parties may provide for arbitrazzReed v. St. Louis S. W. R. Co., 95 S.W. (2d) 887 (Mo. App. 2936); St. Louis B. & M.
Ry. Co. v. Booker, 5 S.W. (2d) 856 (Tex. Civ. App. x936); Wyatt v. Kansas City Southern
Ry. Co., XoI S.W. (2d) io82 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
12 Bell v. Western Ry. Co., 228 Ala. 328, 153 So. 434 (1934).
13 Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Curtis, 245 S.W. 781 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Youmans v.
Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co., 175 S.C. 99, 178 S.E. 671 (1935).
X4Cousins v. Pullman Co., 72 S.W. (2d) 356 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Harrison v. Pullman

Co., 68 F.

(2d)

826 (C.C.A. 8th 1934).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

tion as to the amount of the loss under an insurance policy, but not as to
the company's liability under such a policy.5 The same rule has been applied to provisions for settling disputes under a craft agreement. 6 Under
this rule some courts, though requiring exhaustion of the remedies provided in the contract, have held ineffective the provision that the decision
so given was final and binding.'1
It might be noticed in passing that the Railway Labor Act of 1934 provides that the railroad, and the union representing any class of employees,
may set up a system of adjustment boards for the settlement of disputes
arising under a collective agreement. 8 The finality of the award rendered
by the board of adjustment has been sustained on the ground that the Act
has changed the earlier public policy; ' 9 but some courts have apparently
not accepted this view.20
b) Judicialrelief.-Assuming that there is no provision for a board to
settle disputes under the craft agreement, or that prior recourse to the
board is not required, or, if required, has been satisfied and that subsequent judicial suit is consequently not precluded, there still remains the
question of whether the courts will enforce the individual employee's
rights under the craft agreement. On the assumption that all obstacles to
resort to the court have been removed, we proceed to consider judicial
relief.
If there has been an invasion of his rights under the contract between
his employer and the union, the individual may sue in an action at law and
recover damages from his employer. 2' If the union has participated in and
induced this breach on the part of the employer, the former should also be
liable in damages under the doctrine of Lumley v. Gye.Equitable relief is of importance when the individual employee's
seniority is involved or when he has been discharged contrary to the provisions of a craft agreement which provides that discharge shall not be
made without cause, or without hearing, or both. It is of very practical
importance to the employee whether he must sue periodically for damISSupreme Council of Order of Chosen Friends v. Forsinger, 125 Ind. 52, 25 N.E. 129
(i8go); Niagara Fire Insurance Co. v. Bishop, 154 Ill. 9, i6, 39
16 Rentschler

v. Missouri Pacific R. Co.,

126

Neb. 493,

253

.E. 1102, iio4 (1894).
N.W. 694 (1934).

17 Supreme Council of Order of Chosen Friends v. Forsinger, 125

Ind.

52, 25

(18go).
'8 48 Stat. 1x93 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 153, Second (Supp. 1938).
19 Bell v. Western Ry., 228 Ala. 328, 153 So. 434 (1934).
20 Rentschler v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 126 Neb. 493, 253 N.W. 694 (1934).

2 See cases cited in notes 5, 6, and 14 supra.
2 2 E. & B. 216 (1853).

N.E.

129
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ages or whether he can compel observance of his rights. The amount recoverable in a suit for damages by an individual employee might often be
small as compared with the cost of litigation. The employer knows this,
and, if the employee is always compelled to resort to an action at law, he
can very often be deprived of his rights. On the other hand, a large number of interested employees may join in a suit for injunction or other
equitable relief.
Two questions are presented in considering equitable relief. The first is
whether the employee's right is one that equity will enforce; the second
concerns the problem of enforcing personal service contracts.
Many of the earlier cases, by way of ditta, expressed doubt as to
whether seniority was a property right which equity could enforce. The
cases, other than those considered later under the question of personal
service, denied relief because of failure to join necessary partiesS23 or because of failure to exhaust remedies within the union.24 Some courts denied relief because the action taken was in accord with laws of the union
and did not violate the craft agreement 2 5 or because of technical errors in
6
connection with the appeal.2
Aware that the legal concept of property rights has broadened with the
changes in our economic and industrial system 2 7 the courts have recognized that "the right to work ....
is as much property as the more
obvious forms of goods and merchandise, stocks and bonds2''2 and that
"destroying the means of acquiring wealth is the same as destroying the
wealth itself. ' ' 29 Consequently they have held that "the right to earn a
livelihood .... should .... be entitled to protection" by a court of
equity in the same manner as other property rights.3°
Seniority represents in the highest degree the right to work. By seniority the oldest man in point of service (ability and fitness for the job being
23 McMurray v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 50 F. (2d) 968 (D.C. Pa. 1931).
24 Burger v. McCarthy, 84 W.Va. 697, zoo S.E. 492 (i99); Shaup v. Grand Internat'l

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,

223 Ala. 202, 135 So. 327 (1931).
2s Shaup v. Grand Internat'l Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,

223

Ala.

202,

r35

So. 327 (i93i); Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 188 N.E. 705 (1934); Aulich v. Craigmyle,
248 Ky. 676, 59 S.W. (2d) 56o (i933).
26 Hunt v. Dunlap, 248 S.W. 76o (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
27 Grand Intemat'l Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 3 P.
(2d) 971 (1934).

Mass.

N.E. 853, 855 (1916).

28

Bogni v. Perotti,

29

Grand Internat'l Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 31 P.

224

152, 154, 112

(2d) 971 (1934).

30Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 38 (i915); Ledford v. Chicago M., St. P. & P. R. Co.,
298 Ill. App. 298, 311-12 (1939).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

sufficient) is given the choice of jobs, is the first promoted within the range
of jobs subject to seniority, and is the last laid off. It proceeds so on down
the line to the youngest in point of service. Seniority is more than merely
the right to work; it is the best kind of unemployment insurance. It assures the man that the longer he works the more certain it is that he will
retain his job at a wage greater than the small amount available as
unemployment compensation. Seniority is no less a property right and
entitled to equitable protection because it is subject to modification by
changing the craft agreement by which it was created or because the
employee is subject to discharge and is not required by the craft agreement to continue to work for the employer.-'
Other bases of sustaining equity jurisdiction under the orthodox property doctrine have been suggested. One of the earlier cases, though expressing by dictum its doubt as to seniority being a vested property right,
conceded that "such rights (seniority) are closely akin to one's 'calling,'
and that an unlawful invasion or interference therewith would constitute
a wrong of which the courts would take cognizance. ' ' 32 In Illinois, one's
profession is a property right which is entitled to equitable protection.33
In many respects seniority is a greater protection to the employee than a
license is to the professional man. The latter prevents competition only
from those not admitted to the profession. The former protects the employee not only against the man not within the seniority district but also
from the younger men in the same district.
While the rights of A against B under a contract are customarily considered as personal and not property rights, the contract status between
34
A and B as against an outsider, C, is the property of both A and B. If C

induces either A or B to breach the contract or otherwise interferes with
the contractual relations of A and B, even though such action does not
involve a breach of contract, as where an employment at will is terminated, the courts of equity will grant relief. 35 If the union induces the
employer to take such action as will cause a breach by the employer of the
individual employee's rights under the collective bargaining contract,
31See cases collected in note 7.
32Shaup

v. Grand Internat'l Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,

223

Ala.

202,

x35 So.

327 (193l)33 Kalman
34

v. Walsh, 355 Ill.
341, 346, 189 N.E. 315, 317 (1934).
Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill.
6o8, 61g (1898); Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 171

Minn. 260, 214

N.W. 754

(1927).

3sWilson v. Hey, 232 Il1. 389, 83 N.E. 928 (igo8); Carpenter's Union v. Citizens' Com6o8 (i8gS); London
mittee, 333 Ill.
225, 164 N.E. 393 (1928); Doremnus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill.
Guarantee Co. v. Horn, 2o6 IlL. 493, 69 N.E. 526 (i9o3).
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there has been an invasion by the union of the contract status between the
employer and the employee. The injured employee is entitled to an injunction restraining the union from so inducing the employer. Seniority,
therefore, is a right, call it property or what you please, of such a nature as
36
equity will protect.
In other cases equitable relief has been granted to the individual em37
ployee in his seniority because of the inadequacy of his legal remedy.
The men are arranged in order of their seniority, and this list is known as
the seniority roster. If a number of men are displaced or misplaced on a
seniority roster, it is later impossible to determine what job each of such
men would have received but for the displacement or misplacement. No
man can tell what jobs would have been open to him and which of these
he would have selected until every man ahead of him on the roster has
made his choice. Besides there are many elements other than the rate of
pay which enter into an employee's choice. An important consideration is
the hours of work, i.e., whether a night or day or split shift, with the
attendant factors of available hours of rest, pleasure, and association with
friends. These are personal factors, and cannot be measured in terms of
money damages. "The very fact that the contract itself provides rights of
seniority where the pay is the same is evidence that such rights are considered as of sufficient value to demand protection," which only equity
38
can give.
Only three cases have been found which hold that equity will not grant
relief for violations of seniority rights.39 These cases rest on the ground
that the contracts involve personal service and that the court will not
decree performance of such a contract and will not interfere in the employer's business.
It is quite generally held that since an employer cannot specifically
compel an employee to work for him, the courts will not compel the employer to rehire an employee who has been discharged in violation of his
contract of employment. This rule is generally followed where the em36 Nord

v. Griffin, 86 F. (2d) 481 (C.C.A. 7th 1936) cert. denied 30o U.S. 673 (I937); Gleason

v. Thomas, 117 W.Va. 55o, i86 S.E. 3o4 (1936); Grand Internat'l Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 3I P. (2d) 971 (1934); Crisler v. Crum, ii5 Neb. 375, 213
N.W. 366 (1927); Piercy v. L. & N. Ry. Co., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042 (1923).
37 Gregg v. Starks, 188 Ky. 834, 224 S.W. 459 (1920); Grand Internat'l Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 31 P. (2d) 971 (1934); Nord v. Griffin, 86 F.
(2d) 481 (C.C.A. 7 th 1936) cert. denied Soo U.S. 673 (1937).
39 Gregg v. Starks, i88 Ky. 834, 224 S.W. 459 (1920).
39 Chambers v. Davis, 128 Miss. 613, oi So. 346 (1922); Mosshamer v. Wabash Ry. Co.,
221 Mich. 407, x91 N.W. 210 (1922); Ryan v. New York Central R. Co., 267 Mich. 202, 255
N.W. 365 (1934).
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ployee has been actually discharged contrary to the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. 40 But a distinctly different situation is presented where the employee has not been discharged, but continues in his
employment. In such a case the employee merely demands the terms of
the craft agreement be carried out so long as he is employed. This distinction has been observed not only by the courts in granting relief in seniority
cases, 4' but also in other types of cases. For instance, while employees
cannot be enjoined individually or collectively from ceasing to work or
from striking, the union and its officials may be enjoined from calling a
strike in violation of the trade agreement. 42 Outside persons may be prevented from interfering with the employer-employee relationship; and the
employer may be enjoined from breaking his contract with the union.43
This distinction was overlooked by the Michigan court and rejected by
the majority of the court in the Mississippi case.44 These cases, however,
represent a decided minority, and courts have generally granted equitable
45
relief in a proper case.
Some recent cases have indicated a basis for equitable relief even in case
of discharge. In California a musician's union successfully enjoined certain theaters from operating talking pictures without an orchestra contrary to the agreement with the union. 46 The court granted relief on the
ground that an employer could enjoin a union from calling a strike in violation of its contract. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals, following the
California decision, restrained the defendants from employing non-union
labor contrary to a dosed shop agreement with the plaintiff union. 47 Both
of these cases emphasized that the very nature of collective bargaining
contracts, by which the employer is not bound to hire and the employees
are not bound to work, requires equitable relief. "While recognizing fully
Beatty v. C. B. & Q. R. Co., 49 Wyo.

40

22, 52

P. (2d) 404 (1935).

41Gleason

v. Thomas, i7 W.Va. 55o, x86 S.E. 304 (1936); Grand Intemat'l Brotherhood
of Locomotive Engineers v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 31 P. (2d) 971 (I934); see dissenting opinion
in Chambers v. Davis, 128 Miss. 613, 91 So. 346 (1922); Ledford v. Chicago M. St. P. & P.
R. Co., 298 Ill.
App. 298, 308, 309 (1939).
4- Preble v. Architectural Iron Workers' Union, 26o Ill.
App. 435 (1931).
43 Weber v. Nasser, 286 P. io74 (Cal. App. 1930); Harper v. Local Union No. 520, 48 S.W.
(2d) 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 2932).
44 See dissenting opinion in Chambers v. Davis, 228 Miss. 613, 9x So. 346 (1922).
4s Weber v. Nasser, 286 P. 2o74 (Cal. App. i93o); Grand Internat'l Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379,31 P. (2d) 972 (1934); Harper v. Local Union No. 520,
48 S.W. (2d) 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (specifically approves Weber v. Nasser).
46Weber v. Nasser, 286 P. i74 (Cal. App. i93o).
47

Harper v. Local Union No. 520, 48 S.W. (2d) 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
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the general rules under which an injunction is denied to enforce a contract
for personal service," the California court held "that the law keeps pace
with the requirements of justice, and .... none of these principles are applicable to contracts of the character" of collective bargaining agreements
"as the facts are so extraordinary as to require injunctive relief if a
plaintiff is to have any protection in his contract rights ..... " On this
analysis a similar result may be reached in Illinois since the Illinois court
has held that a union will be enjoined from calling a strike in breach of its
contract, 48 and that an employer's association will be restrained from
seeking to have prospective employers refuse to hire union labor49
Does it follow from the above discussion that an individual employee
who has been discharged can enjoin the employer from putting anyone
else in the position to which the plaintiff employee is entitled by seniority
or otherwise? If so, the employer probably will rehire the plaintiff rather
than leave the job vacant, just as the theater owners probably hired the
orchestra rather than not show talking pictures or the employer in the
Texas case hired union men rather than shut down his plant for lack of
workmen.
Furthermore, will a court insist, as it did in Lumley v. Wagnero that
there be an express agreement, or will the court imply an agreement not
to place another in the position to which the plaintiff's seniority entitles
him? In addition, since in suits to enjoin an employee from working for
another in breach of his contract, evidence of uniqueness of the employee's
services is required,5' will a similar showing be required of an employee
seeking to restrain an employer from placing another in such employee's
position? As to the last query, it might be said that it may not be so
difficult to make such a showing. Many employees have devoted their
lives to a particular line of work and, as a result, have become highly
proficient therein and are entirely unqualified to fill jobs in other lines of
work which command a corresponding wage. This is true, for instance, of
railroad operating employees such as engineers, firemen, conductors, and
other trainmen. However, these questions have not as yet been answered
by the courts but should be kept in mind in connection with the problem
of equitable relief under collective agreements.
c) Legislative tribunal.-The trend in legislation has been to provide

special tribunals to handle disputes arising out of the interpretation or ap49 Preble v. Architectural Worker's Union, 260 Ill. App. 435 (193).

49Carpenter's Union v. Citizens Committee, 333 Ill.

225, 164 N.E. 393 (1928).
so i De G. M. & G. 604 (1852); 5 Williston, Contracts §§ x447-49 (rev. ed. I937).

s, 5 Williston, op. cit. supra note 5o, at § i45o.
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plication of craft agreements. In England it is the Industrial Court and in
Sweden it is the Labor Court.5 2 In this country the pioneering has been
done with the railroads through the National Railroad Adjustment Board
under the Railway Labor Act. 3 As the advance guard of further legislation it is important to consider the organization, powers and procedure of
this board and also the constitutional requirements which must be satisfied in such a tribunal.
The National Railroad Adjustment Board is made up of eighteen members selected by the carriers and eighteen by the labor organizations.
Each member is compensated by the party he is to represent. The board
is divided into four divisions, each division handling disputes for certain
classes of employees. Decisions of the Adjustment Board are by majority
vote of all members of the division. In the event of a deadlock or inability to get a majority vote, the division selects or, if it cannot agree, the
Mediation Board selects a third party as referee to sit with the division
and make an award.
What was said previously of a non-union employee's opportunities before a board set up by agreement with equal employer and union representation applies nearly as well to the National Adjustment Board if the
employee complains of the joint action of the carrier and the union. Although most if not all of the members are not representatives of the particular carrier or union involved, these men have all had or may have
trouble with an individual opposing or asserting his individual rights
against the union and the employer. This is a practical aspect although
no showing could be made to sustain a legal objection.54 In contrast the
membership of the Swedish Industrial Court contains not only several
neutral parties but also at least one member who is trained in law and
experienced in judicial procedure.55
The act provides that the board "shall give due notice of all hearings to
the employee or employees and the carrier or carriers involved in any dispute." The board, however, at first held that where a complaint was filed
by the union that a member's seniority entitled him to a certain job, the
employee who was then occupying the job and who would be displaced if
the petitioner succeeded was not entitled to notice. An award so ren6
dered was promptly set aside by the court as violating due process5
5,

Comnm'n Report, note 9 sZpra.

5348 Stat. z89 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. § I53, First, (a), (g), (h), (1), (n) (Supp. i938).
54 Cook v. Des Moines Union Ry. Co., 16 F. Supp. 8o (Iowa 1936)..
55 Comm'n Report, note 9 supra.

s6 Nord v. Griffin, 86 F. (2d) 481 (C.C.A. 7th x936) cerl. denied 300 U.S. 673 (1937).
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The decisions of the board are final and binding on the parties, except
that the railroad can secure judicial review by refusing to comply with the
award. In such event the act provides that "any person for whose benefit
such order was made" may file a petition in the United States district
court to enforce the award. On such petition the same proceedings are had
as in any civil suit, including the right to a jury,S7 except that the findings
and order of the board are primafacieevidence of the facts therein stated.
The district court is empowered under its rules governing actions at law
to make such order and enter such judgment as is necessary to enforce or
set aside the order of the board.'5
No appeal is given the carrier on its own initiative. It must wait for a
petition for enforcement of the award to be filed. This has brought forth
criticism from management on the ground that the unions often refuse to
file a petition to enforce and instead use the threat of a strike as the means
of enforcing the board's award. In the meantime the management can do
nothing to secure a judicial review, the pendency of which it is felt might
have the practical effect of preventing a strike or threat of such action.
If the award is against the petitioning employee, he is afforded no judicial review by the act. This is equally true of the employee who is adversely affected by the Board's ruling in favor of a petitioning employee
who claims that his seniority rights have been violated. The constitutional
aspects of this problem are considered later,
The last sentence in the paragraph relating to enforcement of the
award59 reads:
.... The district courts are empowered, under the rules of the court governing
actions, to make such order and enter such judgements, by writ of mandamus or other-

wise, as may be appropriate to enforce or set aside the order ....
board,

of the adjustment

This sentence would seem, and at least one court has so interpreted it,

to refer only to the petition to enforce the award.0 Even if this sentence
could be interpreted as affording an additional remedy which might be
used to set aside the award, the only two common law remedies to review
the orders of boards are prohibition and certiorari. As the Conformity Act
s7 Cook v. Des Moines Union Ry. Co. i6 F. Supp. 81o (Iowa 1936).
's

48 Stat. z19i

(1934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 153, First, (p) (Supp. x938). In contrast with the

fact that the decisions of the Adjustment Board are only prima face evidence as to that
board's findings, the findings of the National Labor Relations Board as to the facts are conclusive if there is substantial evidence in the record to support them. 49 Stat. 453 (935), 29
U.S.C.A. § x6o (e) (Supp. 1938).
s9 48 Stat. xigi (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 153, First, (p) (Supp. r938).
60Lane v. Union Terminal Co. 12 F. Supp. 204 (Tex. t935).
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is superseded by the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,6' the situation
is presented in which the federal courts are no longer bound by the state
procedure and yet they have no independent body of judicial precedent
of their own on these common law remedies. Rule 81 abolishes the writ
of mandamus and permits the "relief heretofore available by mandamus"
to be obtained by a motion. This apparently does not change the scope
of the relief or review. No provision is made in the rules as to the writs of
prohibition or certiorari. Until there are decisions by the federal courts,
it can only be assumed that these courts will follow the general common
law rule as to the scope of review afforded by these common law remedies.
In such a case none of the remedies of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari
would afford review of the merits of the controversy, either as to the law
62
or the facts.
Unlike an award of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, a decision of the Labor Court of Sweden is final and binding without any appeal,
while an award of the British Industrial Court is binding only if in the
particular case the parties so agree in advance.63 Sweden prohibits strikes
and lockouts over disputes as to the interpretation of, or enforcement of,
rights under collective agreements and requires their submission to the
Labor Court. In contrast, in seeking to avoid interruption of interstate
commerce arising from similar disputes, the Congress of the United States
6' 48 Stat. IO64 (1934), 28 U.S.C.A. § 723b (Supp. 1938). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are found in 1938 Supplement to 28 U.S.C.A. following Section 723c and commencing
at page roo.
62The writ of prohibition issues only to prevent a body from acting outside its jurisdiction
and not to review the merits of the action of that body. People v. Circuit Court, 347 Ill. 34,
179 N.E. 44I (i931). In some states, such as Indiana, the common law writ of certiorari does
not exist, Ex parte Sherwood, 41 Ind. App. 642, 647, 84 N.E. 783, 785 (I9O8), and where it
exists, as in Illinois, it generally lies only (i) where the inferior body has exceeded its jurisdiction or (2) where such body has not proceeded according to law. The second ground means
that the court has not followed the form of proceeding legally applicable in such a case and
does not authorize a review on the basis that the rulings of the inferior body were erroneous.
People v. Lindblom, 182 Ill. 241, 55 N.E. 358 (1899). In determining whether the inferior tribunal had jurisdiction the court will review the jurisdictional facts, the evidence of which must
be preserved. Carroll v. Houston, 341 Ill. 531, 173 N.E. 657 (193o); Funkhouser v. Coffin,
301 Ill. 257, 133 N.E. 649 (1922). Because of certain statutory prerequisites to action by
boards, the review of the question of jurisdiction may sometimes come very close to a review
of the merits. For instance, if the statute permits the removal of a civil service employee only
for cause, the existence of cause is a jurisdictional fact which must appear from- the evidence
preserved in the record. Funkhouser v. Coffin, 301 Ill. 257, 133 N.E. 649 (1922). But in the
case of a dispute between an employee and his employer or between employees as to rights
under collective bargaining agreements, the merits of such disputes involve no jurisdictional
aspects by which a review of the merits can be secured through certiorari. That mandamus
offers no relief see note go infra.
63Comm'n Report, note 9 supra.
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has proceeded on the theory that such interruption can in large measure be
eliminated by providing a tribunal to which the parties may resort, if they
wish, without compelling them to do so. Submission remains voluntary.
This was the underlying philosophy of the Transportation Act of 192064
and the Railway Labor Act of 1926,65 and persists under its amended form
of 1934;66 Congress changed the personnel and form of and procedure be-

fore the Board and finally made the decisions of the board involving the
interpretation and application of agreements binding and legally enforceable. But at all times Congress kept to its original purpose that the machinery of the act for the settlement of disputes should remain entirely
6
voluntary. 7
This is no better emphasized than in the provisions of subparagraph (i)
of Section 3.18 It provides that disputes involving grievances or interpretation or application of agreements "shall be handled in the usual
manner" up through the highest operating officer of the carrier authorized
to handle such matters, but that, if no adjustment is reached, "the dis"441 Stat, 469 (1920), 45 U.S.C.A. §§ x31, 146 (1928), repealed 44 Stat. 587
U.S.C.A. §§ 131-46 (Supp. 1938).
6544 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 Mason's U.S. Code, § 146 (1926).
6648 Stat. 1185 (i934), 45 U.S.C.A. §§ i51-64 (Supp. 1938).

(1926),
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67The provisions of the Transportation Act of 192o relating to the effort of the employer
and employees to negotiate contracts and settle disputes were a mere declaration of policy
and did not state an obligation. The same was true with respect to the right of employees to
organize. Submission of disputes was voluntary and the decisions of the Labor Board were
not enforceable by legal process but instead depended upon public opinion for their effect.
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States Railroad Board, 261 U.S. 72 (x923); Pennsylvania R.
System, etc. Federation v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 267U.S. 203 (1925). In 1926 the Transportation Act was repealed and the Railway Labor Act was passed. The Labor Board was abolished
and provision made for adjustment boards to be set up by each carrier and its employees. The
purpose of the act as disclosed by congressional debates, 67 Cong. Rec. 88io-ii, 88is, 888r,
9044, 905I, 4504, 4523, 4569, 4651 (6 9 th Cong. ist Sess. 1926), and its wording discloses
a studied effort to keep the submission of disputes voluntary, although provision is made for
the enforcement of arbitration awards to which the parties have voluntarily submitted. The
employees are given the right to organize and to select representatives without interference

but no duty is placed on the employer to deal with such representatives. Texas & N. 0. R.
Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. and Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930). Similar assertions (78
Cong. Rec. 11713, 11715, 11814, 11253 (73d Cong. 2d Sess. 1934)) and provisions for voluntary submission of disputes characterize the 1934 amendment which provided for a National

Adjustment Board because many railroads had not set up their own boards by agreement
with their employees, and because deadlocks had resulted in such boards as had been created.
The decision of the Adjustment Board was made binding and provision made for its enforcement in the district courts. The carrier was not only prohibited from interfering with the
organization of its employees but also required to treat with the representatives selected by a
majority of the employees of any craft or class. Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Federation No.
40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
6848 Stat. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 153, First, (i)(Supp. 1938).
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putes may be referred" to the Adjustment Board by the parties or by
either of them. In other words, while the parties are required to exhaust
the methods of settlement by negotiation, they have the option either to
submit the matter to the Adjustment Board, or to resort to the ordinary
methods of strike or lockout.
With the Railway Labor Act before us as a concrete example, let us
consider the constitutional limitations which must be observed in setting
up special tribunals to hear and decide these legal labor questions.
So long as the demands of due process are met, a state may distribute
its powers as it sees fit. In pursuance of this freedom it may, so far as
concerns the federal Constitution, vest any board it wishes with judicial
powers. As due process does not require the right of appeal, the state is
not required to provide for judicial appeal from the decisions of such
boards. 69 It is not possible to consider in this article the requirements of
°
the various state constitutions3
On the other hand, when Congress creates boards to hear disputes arising under industrial agreements, an entirely different situation is presented. Congress cannot "withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter
which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at common law, or in
equity, or admiralty." 7' As to such matters, however, Congress may provide for the determination of the facts by a board just as by a master in
chancery, referee or commissioner so long as the proper judicial review of
2
questions of law and jurisdictional questions of fact is retained.
In this light what is the nature of the disputes which arise under craft
agreements? They involve the contractual rights of the individual employees. The rights are in that sense no different from those of a party
under any other contract. Consequently, there can be no doubt that when
these rights are involved we have a "matter, which from its nature, is the
subject of a suit at common law, or in equity."
These rights are not created by Congress but arise by private contract
between the parties. Congress has merely provided a forum for their en69 Reetz v. Michigan, i88 U.S. 505 (x9o3); Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207
U.S. 541 (1907).
70 For a comprehensive statement of the methods of judicial review from various boards
of each state, see Appendix to Report of the Committee on Administrative Agencies and

Tribunals of the Section on Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association, 63
A.B.A. Rep. 623, 632 (1938).
71Den ex der. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., i8 How. (U.S.) 272, 284
(IS5)72Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 48 (1932).
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forcement. 7- Contrasting illustrations are the enforcement of rights given
by the National Labor Relations Act 74 or even by that part of the Railway
Labor Act which provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively. 75 The authority of Congress to set up boards to hear disputes involving violation of the craft agreement cannot rest on those cases which
hold that where Congress has created a right it may, as part of the nature
and extent of the right, provide for its enforcement and may make such
76
method exclusive.
Two other sources of Congressional power are the judicial power and
the power over interstate commerce. Since the right sought to be enforced
is created by private contract, the case does not arise under the laws of the
United States. Only occasionally will there be diversity of citizenship.
There is applicable none of the other classes of cases covered by the
judicial power of the United States under Article 3, Section 2, Clause i of
the federal Constitution. It is only in the class of cases covered by this
provision that Congress may bestow jurisdiction on the federal courts
under the judicial power. 77 Since Congress can give jurisdiction in matters cognizable at common law or in equity to boards only as a fact finding
adjunct of the federal courts, the congressional authority to establish
these boards under the judicial power is limited to the extent to which it
could create original jurisdiction in the federal courts. There is, therefore,
no source of authority for such boards under the judicial power.
The authority of Congress under the interstate commerce clause has
been held to extend "to such regulations of the relations of rail carriers to
their employees as are reasonably calculated to prevent the interruption
of interstate commerce by strikes and their attendant disorders." 78 Within reasonable limits Congress may determine what is "reasonably calculated to prevent ....strikes." Within this limitation Congress has in
the railroad industry and may in other interstate industries establish such
tribunals as will facilitate the settlement of disputes under craft agree73 Malone v. Gardner, 62 F. (2d) iS (C.C.A. 4th
Co., 62 F. (2d) 2o (C.C.A. 4th 1932).

1932);

Parrish v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.

74 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § z6o (Supp. 1938); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
7s 48 Stat. I186 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 152 (Supp. 1938).
76See note 74 supra, and also Progressive Miners of America v. Peabody Coal Co., 75F.
(2d) 460 (C.C.A. 7th 1935), aff'g Stanley v. Peabody Coal Co., 5 F. Supp. 612 (I1.. I933).
77Hodgson and Thompson v. Bowerbank, 5 Cranch (U.S.) 303 (i8og); Owings v. Nor-

wood's Lessee, 5 Cranch (U.S.) 344 (x8og).
78Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
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ments thus promoting peaceful industrial relations and preventing interruption to commerce. The authority to establish these boards for the trial
of rights arising under the craft agreements comes from, but only from, the
interstate commerce clause and within the limitations stated above.
The next question which arises is: May Congress make the jurisdiction
of such boards exclusive and remove the ordinary and otherwise existing
judicial remedies at law or in equity?
Again it is necessary to distinguish those cases in which it is held that
Congress in creating a right may prescribe the exclusive remedy for its
enforcement. In such a case the right is one that arises under the laws of
the United States.9 Since it is a case "to which the judicial power of the
United States extends, Congress may rightfully vest exclusive jurisdiction
in the federal courts ...... 80 Since Congress has no power over disputes
under craft agreements under its judicial power, it has no right under that
power to make the jurisdiction of these boards exclusive.
Once more we must turn to the interstate commerce clause. Here becomes important the Supreme Court's limitation of the authority of
Congress over the relations of employers and their employees to that
which is "reasonably calculated to prevent the interruption of interstate
commerce by strikes ..... " Making available a tribunal like the Adjustment Board may induce the parties to submit their disputes rather than
to strike; but in order to prevent strikes it is not necessary to prevent the
parties from resorting to their ordinary judicial remedies. The very submission of a dispute to court is as much a substitution of peaceful settlement for strife as submission to a tribunal set up by Congress. To prevent strikes it is not necessary to say: "If you have decided not to strike
but to settle the dispute peacefully, you cannot do so in court but must
go before the Adjustment Board."
The regulation found under the Interstate Commerce Act and the
Shipping Act and the extent of Congress' power to make exclusive the
jurisdiction of the commissions under those acts .is
to be distinguished
from the regulation of employer-employee relations. Both of those acts
aim at uniformity of rate, tariffs and practices of the carriers. The purpose
of setting up an Adjustment Board under the Labor Act is to lessen strikes
by providing a tribunal for settlement of disputes and not to secure a
uniform interpretation of the craft agreements. Then too, there is no
more need for that than there is in the case of an insurance company writing policies in many states. Such uniformity would be impossible. There
79U.S. Const. Art.
soThe

III, § 2 (1).
Moses Taylor v. Harnmons, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 411 (z866).
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is a separate and different craft agreement between practically every employer and every class of employee. For example, in the railroad industry
alone every railroad has a different contract with at least each of seven
different classes of employees-engineers, firemen, conductors, brakemen
and other trainmen, switchmen, clerks and mechanical tradesmen. There
are more than i20 class one railroads in the United States. This accounts
for 84o different craft agreements in the railroad industry alone.
The Interstate Commerce Act and the Shipping Act control and regulate the rates, tariffs and practices of ghe interstate carriers and steamship
companies. In this sense the powers of the commissions under both acts
are essentially administrative. The provision for suits by shippers is in
connection with this regulation. Under the Railway Labor Act there is no
attempt to control or regulate the terms of the agreements between the
carriers and the unions concerning rates of pay and working conditions.
The act merely seeks to present a tribunal to which may be submitted the
disputes arising under the agreements after they are made.
It is submitted, therefore, that under, but only under, its authority over
interstate commerce may Congress establish these boards for the adjudication of the contractual rights of the employees under craft agreements;
that under this power Congress cannot exclude the ordinary remedies in
the courts. Congress may establish these boards only as additional forums.
Since there must be judicial review of the orders of boards established
by Congress to hear cases arising under craft agreements, the extent of
this review is important. The famous and much discussed case of Crowell
v. Bensonfx requires that the court ascertain de novo the jurisdictional facts.
These would be that the employees involved in the dispute or at least the
class of employees covered by the craft agreement were engaged in or
sufficiently related to interstate commerce and that the relationship of
employer and employee existed. The act involved in that case (Shipping
Act) provided for judicial review of questions of law including the question of whether as a matter of law there was any evidence (not the weight
of the evidence) to sustain the board's finding. By the court's emphasis on
this latter provision in upholding the constitutionality of the act and in
light of the decisions giving such review on bills in equity to enjoin the
orders of the commissions under the Interstate Commerce Act and the
Shipping Act, 82 it is safe to say that the courts must be afforded a review
81Crowell v. Benson,

285 U.S. 22 (1932).
2Interstate Commerce Conim'n v. L. & N. Ry. Co.,

8

Commerce Comm'n v. Union Pacific R. Co.,
22 (1932).

222

U.S. 541

227

(1912);

U.S. 88 (i913); Interstate
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
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of questions of law, including the question as to whether there is any
3
evidence to support the findings of fact.
By way of summary, the minimum constitutional requirements for
boards hearing disputes under craft agreements are that there must be
afforded to all interested parties judicial review de novo of jurisdictional
questions of fact and a review of questions of law, including the question
of whether there is any evidence (not the weight of the evidence) to sustain the board's findings of fact.
How do the provisions of the Railway Labor Act relative to the National Adjustment Board meet these requirements? As to the railroad, ample constitutional guaranty of judicial review is afforded by the procedure on a petition to enforce the order. In fact as the findings of the
board are only prima facie evidence, the review afforded goes far beyond the requirements. The employee who files the case before the board
is not given judicial review of an unfavorable decision. If recourse to the
courts were excluded and he were compelled to bring his case before the
board, then the act would be unconstitutional as to him. On the other
hand, if creation of the board has not excluded the ordinary judicial remedies so that the petitioning employee has the option of proceeding before
the board or in court, he cannot complain. He has voluntarily waived his
right to a judicial determination for one by the board alone.
An analogous situation is found under the Interstate Commerce Act.
That act specifically provides that any person injured by a common carrier may have his choice of bringing suit against the carrier in the courts
or by filing a complaint before the Commission. Resort to one excludes
the other. a In connection with this provision of the act is to be read the
judicial code in which provision is made for injured persons to enjoin an
order of the Commission.8 s Under the provisions of these two acts, it has
been held that if the Commission refuses relief to the shipper against the
carrier, the shipper cannot have judicial review of the order, whereas if the
Commission enters an order against the carrier, the latter can secure judicial review.8 6 Thus the carrier, not having the choice of the tribunal before which the claim is prosecuted, has a right to judicial review of an
83In addition to the cases under the Interstate Commerce and Shipping Acts see Federal
289 U.S. 266, 276 (1933), and
the cases involving the Nat'l Labor Relations Act cited in note 1 supra. For a discussion of
the power of courts to set aside administrative orders see address of Honorable Marvin B.
Rosenberry, Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 24 A.B.A.J. 279 (3938).
84 24 Stat. 382 (1887), 49 U.S.C.A. § 9 (I929).
85,38 Stat. 219 (1913), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (28) (1927).

Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortgage Co.,

86Standard

Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 235 (1931).
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adverse order of the Commission, but the shipper, having voluntarily
chosen to prosecute his claim before the Commission instead of in court,
cannot secure judicial review of the Commission's order.
It is quite apparent from the obvious use of the word "may" in reference
to submission of disputes to the Adjustment Board and in light of the
decisions under the former acts and congressional debate8l that Congress
has intended to and has left the choice open to the complaining employee
whether to institute proceedings before the Board or in court. Under the
rule of law that a statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to
avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also any
grave doubts upon that score,88 the Railway Labor Act must be construed
as merely establishing an additional and optional remedy to that afforded by the courts.
A different situation is presented with the employee who does not file
the complaint before the Board but is drawn into the case because the
dispute involves his rights, as for instance rival claims to the same job in
a dispute over seniority. He had no choice between the Board and
the courts. Yet he has no opportunity to secure on his own initiative
judicial review. As it is usually only a question of which of two or more
employees is entitled to certain jobs, the railroad has no personal interest
in the outcome; consequently it will not go to the expense and trouble of
compelling a petition to enforce. As to such employees there are grave
doubts as to the constitutionality of the act's provisions relative to the
Adjustment Board. These can be easily remedied by provision for appeal.
There is no adequate judicial relief from orders of the Adjustment
Board by means other than those afforded by statute. As previously discussed, the legal remedies of certiorari and prohibition do not afford review
of the merits.8 9 Neither does mandamus which is restricted to compelling
the board to exercise the powers which it possesses but does not compel
the exercise of these powers in any particular way. 90
If the order is void, as for instance a constitutional right is violated,
equity will intervene by injunction to prevent enforcement of the order.
Such has been the case when the Adjustment Board failed to give notice
and opportunity for hearing to an interested employee. 9' But this is en87 Notes 67 and 68 supra.
88United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394 (1916); Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224
(1921); Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boone, 270 U.S. 466 (1926).
39Notes 61 and 62 sUira.
9o People v. La Buy, 3o5 Ill. 1i, 136 N.E. 870 (1922); Post v. Gary, 66 Ill. 143, 46 N.E.

745 (1897).
91Nord v. Griffin, 86 F. (2d) 481 (C.C.A. 7th 1936).
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tirely different from reviewing the order on the basis of the merits of the
controversy.
There is a vague dictum in one case 92 to which a certain distinguished
text writer has called attention, as pointing to a possible review of the.
merits in equity.93 There are statements by some other authors indicating
that federal injunctive relief against federal administrative boards might
afford a review of the merits. 94 But I have been unable to find any case
which, in the absence of some statutory authority, has afforded such relief
or given any theory upon which such relief could be sustained. The statement of the last author, which was only incidental, may have referred to
injunctive relief against orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The cases permitting a review of the merits of an order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission on a bill for an injunction are to be distinguished,
however, as these are specifically authorized by the judicial code. 95 It is
my conclusion, therefore, that in the present absence of statutory authority there can be no review in equity of the merits of a decision of the
National Railroad Adjustment Board.
In conclusion, if in the development of collective bargaining it is seen
fit to establish special tribunals for disputes arising under these agreements, it is constitutionally required and only fair to all concerned that
adequate provision be made for judicial review as a matter of right by all
parties involved. Experience under the National Labor Relations Act
indicates that serious consideration should also be given to allowing the
courts the same review of the findings of fact of an adjustment board as of
the findings of a trial court. Careful thought should be given to establishing these tribunals with a personnel of neutral judges, some of whom
might be non-legal experts in the industry and others lawyers. The impartiality and the calibre of the decisions would then be assured and distrust from the possible, even if remote, interest of the board members
would be eliminated.
92

American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902).

93Freund, Administrative Powers over Persons and Property 346 (1938).
94 24

A.B.A.J.

274,

276 (1938).

9s Note 85 snpra.

